





The interactions between state budget 
and political budget in Syria
Zaki Mehchy
This memo aims to understand how the Syrian regime has used the state budget as a tool 
to reallocate resources for the benefit of warlords and crony capitalists. This mechanism 
plays multiple roles in Syria’s contemporary political economy: on one hand, it is one of 
the means by which elites are given access to political funds in exchange for their loyalty 
(and other political services). At the same time, it represents one of the different ways in 
which the regime can replenish its political budget, which refers to the funds available for 
the ruler for discretionary spending on its elites to ensure their loyalty (de Waal, 2016). 
The memo analyzes the interactions between state budget and political budget from the 
perspective of an authoritarian bargain during the conflict in Syria. This approach assumes 
that repression is not sufficient for authoritarian regimes, including the Syrian one, to 
sustain control over their countries (Desai et al., 2009). Thus, in parallel to using coercive 
measures, they need to bargain with people and elites. Finally, the memo also investigates 
the modalities through which the elites have increasingly benefitted from public spending. 
The analysis covers Syrian government controlled areas, which includes almost 70 percent 
of Syrian territory (Daher, 2020). During the last 50 years, the Syrian regime has developed 
relationships with a complex network of security and military entities to dominate (and 
penetrate) government and social institutions. These entities include the different security 
branches in addition to the 4th armed brigade and republican guards. They use, or are 
willing to use, coercion and illegitimate extensive power to protect their interests. These 
entities function independently and they monitor each other, but all are managed by the 
head of the regime who is the Syrian president. They are not accountable to but in fact 
are in control of the judicial system, the parliament, the executive government and its 
processes, including the design, approval and implementation of state budget (Mehchy 
et al., 2020). It is worth noting that security and military elites are not involved directly 
in business activities. They either enter into informal arrangements or partnerships with 
businesspersons, or seek to benefit from commercial networks and transactions through 





This study focuses on business elites and their formal access to the state budget.1 These elites 
include crony capitalists and the newly emerged warlords during the conflict. However, they can 
only secure a monopoly over, or preferential access to budgeted state contracts and procurement 
if they share a significant part of the rents with the political elite (Haber, 2002). Thus, analyzing 
the dynamics of top businesspeople is important to understand other types of elites including the 
political elites. The research also argues that the elite dynamics and the abuse of public resources 
have come to pass with the supervision and active approval of the Syrian authorities. 
State budget: a tool of the authoritarian bargain 
The state budget in Syria has reflected a two-level bargain: regime-populace and regime-elite or 
intra-elite. The first one is a sort of social contract between the authority and the citizens under 
which the latter have traded political rights and freedom for economic benefits and public goods 
(Desai et al., 2009). The second level is the ongoing intra-elite political game in which the ruling 
group bargains with elites over how much access to resources they can have in return for their 
support (de Waal, 2016). 
This memo argues that these two types of bargains have an inverse relationship in Syria. This 
means that when the allocated amount for public goods and services increases, the elites’ access 
to government spending decreases, and vice versa. Within this context, the Syrian authority has 
tried to adjust the balance between these two types in a manner that sustains its stability and 
control over the country. The capability of the regime to govern this balance depends largely on 
its financial capacity, political stability, and efficacy of coercion. Indeed, the lack of resources and 
the existential threats towards the authority in Syria has minimized the spending on public goods 
for the benefit of the elites, who provide vital support to this authority, especially during the armed 
conflict. This is a basic dilemma facing transactional regimes under economic pressure. 
The authority-populace bargain in Syria has been clearly reflected in the state budget since the Baath 
Party military coup in March 1963, though of course, it has changed over time. In its early days, the 
Party dominated the Syrian state and non-state institutions. It built its popularity by adopting Arab 
nationalism, fighting against Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and most importantly, by applying 
socialist policies (SCPR, 2013). Thus, at that time, the budget witnessed a surge in subsidies for 
health, education, basic goods in addition to the sharp increase in public employment. In parallel, 
the security spending was magnified and used to constrain basic freedoms, such as the freedom 
of expression (Khasham, 2016). 
Hafez Al-Assad, who ruled Syria between 1970 and 2000, also adopted this type of bargain by 
investing heavily in public goods and services, using a high level of repression at the same time. Yet, 
during the 1980s, the Syrian regime faced several challenges due to its involvement in the Lebanese 
civil war (1975-1991) and the internal armed conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood (SCPR, 2013). 
Further, Gulf countries withdrew their financial support to the regime due to Syrian support for Iran 
during the Iraq-Iranian war (1980-1988). These conflicts forced the regime to use more repression, 
and further increase its security budget. Financially constrained, Al-Assad also found it difficult to 
sustain existing subsidies. Consequently, the Syrian authority increased the prices of subsidized 
goods and services, and also increased the indirect taxes and fees; this resulted in the redistribution 
of wealth from working and middle classes to the influential economic networks. Dalilah (1999) 
estimated the annual sum of the increase in the indirect tax and the decrease in subsidies at less 
than 1 percent of the state budget in 1986, surging to 26 percent in 1997.
1  The paper distinguishes between corruption and political budget. The latter is when the authority provides its business 
elites with legal access to benefit from state budget in return for specific services; whereas corruption is usually illegal access to the 
budget provided by officials for money. See also DE WAAL, A. 2016. Introduction to the Political Marketplace for Policymakers. The 
Justice and Security Research Programme, Policy Brief 1.
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After Bashar Al-Assad was bestowed power in 2000, the public budget continued its shift towards 
less actual subsidies and more market-oriented economic policies. The result was an increase in 
crony capitalism, with concomitant increases in access for elites to state resources and assets, 
even as petty corruption continued unabated. The role of state was reduced in health, education, and 
basic goods, without giving more space for Syrians to express their ideas and opinions freely (SCPR, 
2013). During the conflict, the Syrian authority lost a lot of its capability to use public resources as a 
bargaining tool with Syrian citizens. This was largely due to the lack of financial resources to sustain 
public goods, and the regime’s total reliance on coercive measures to sustain its authority.  
The first type of authoritarian bargain in Syria has therefore been substantially altered as there 
has been a substantial reduction in subsidies and a surge in fees and indirect taxes without any 
improvement in political freedom and rights. In fact, subsidies decreased from around 5 billion USD 
in 2012 to less than 200 million USD in 2020.2 The conflict has worsened the situation and turned 
this type of bargain into mounting, exploitative, and oppressive practices by the Syrian authorities. In 
parallel, the elites have benefitted from public spending. They have managed to increasingly influence 
the formulation and the implementation of fiscal policies; they have also used the development 
spending in state budgets for their own benefits (Haddad, 2012).
The access of business elites to state budgets in Syria has taken two forms (though these may 
overlap in practice). The first one is through the corrupt relations between state officials and 
businesspeople (ICG, 2004), where the latter have bribed their ways to get government contracts 
through offers that do not meet requisite specifications and financial conditions. This usually involves 
relatively small amounts and is illegal by law. The second form is the legal access of business elites 
to public resources – better understood as legalized plunder. The Syrian authorities have approved 
and facilitated this access in return for these elites’ support. 
Since the beginning of 2000s, the second form has notably increased. Many formal contracts 
were signed between the government and crony capitalists, giving these cronies lucrative rent-
opportunities such as a monopoly over the mobile telecommunication sector (Haddad, 2012). 
The rents of these contracts have allowed the elites to largely expand their business activities to 
include legal and traditional economic sectors such as construction, tourism, and internal trade. 
This has created a wide network of small and medium businesspersons, in almost all economic 
sectors, who benefit from the elites and work under their supervision. Through this network, the top 
businesspeople have managed to influence business dynamics inside the country, as required by 
the authority. From the regime’s perspective, this will have minimized any potential collusion among 
businesspeople against its authority. Furthermore, the Syrian regime had considered these elites 
as financial reserves, should they be needed. Indeed, during the conflict, the majority of them have 
reciprocated with unlimited economic and military support. For their part, and in addition to purely 
pecuniary motivations, elite collusion with the regime appears to have been motivated by the fact 
that their own survival was deeply imbricated with the continued existence of the regime. 
The dynamics of political budget
The war economy in Syria has created new and different sources for the political budget, which has 
been distributed by the regime and other newly emerged de facto powers to maintain the loyalty of 
their elites. These sources have included controlling border crossings and checkpoints, monopolizing 
internal trade, selling oil derivatives, and importing basic goods (Turkmani et al., 2015). 
2  Author’s calculations based on state budgets in 2012 and 2020 announced by the Prime Ministry in Syria, and the annual 
average of the market exchange rate of Syrian Pound to US Dollar in the same years.  
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The Syrian regime has also given external actors access to public funds as a way of obtaining and 
ensuring their support. During the conflict, Iran and Russia have signed different agreements with 
the Syrian government, giving them significant influence over many vital public sectors and utilities 
such as mining and ports. For instance, in 2017, the Syrian government had signed a contract  with 
a Russian private company called Stroytransgaz ,through which the Russians monopolized the 
phosphate sector in the country for 50 years (Hatahet, 2019).    
The elites’ access to state budget has also been a way for the Syrian regime to finance its political 
budget. These elites, including traditional cronies and newly-emerged warlords (who made their 
fortunes initially from conflict-related activities such as smuggling, weapons trafficking, imposing 
taxes, and creating checkpoints and  later diversified into other economic sectors), have monopolized 
the supply of basic goods within government controlled areas. They have managed to use their 
shadow companies outside Syria to overcome the impact of sanctions while importing some 
of these goods to Syria. Due to their excessive margins of profit, payments to these companies 
dominate public spending. In return, the elites have had to show loyalty to the Syrian regime. For 
instance, these elites have created and supported pro-regime armed groups in different Syrian 
regions, and they have crowded out businesspeople that were not supportive enough to the regime. 
It is worth noting that the space afforded to elites by the regime has fluctuated over time: business 
elites have had more space to operate (including by raising their own militia) when the regime was 
under threat, with their militia and operations being absorbed by force in more secure periods, or 
when these operations begin to threaten the regime’s authority. The activities of Ayman Jabber, 
a businessman close to the regime prior to the war provide an excellent illustration. Although 
he managed to become extremely powerful in Syria’s coastal regions, and even attracted some 
Russian support, the regime dismantled his militia within a day. 
This part of political budget has become relatively more important despite the sharp deterioration 
in public resources. In 2011, the state budget was about 16.7 billion US dollars, dropping to less 
than 8.5 billion in 2015, and it reached its lowest level in the 2021 government proposed budget at 
2.7 billion US dollars. The current public spending forms about 82 percent of the planned budget 
in 2021 compared to 54 percent in 2011 (Christou and Shaar, 2020). This 2021 spending includes 
about 17% wages and salaries for public workers3; whereas the main share of the remaining 
amount, estimated at 1.5 billion US dollars4, is expected to cover the supply of oil and wheat from 
internal and external sources.5 Many contracts to supply such goods are signed with business 
elites who make a substantial profit from these contracts with the approval of the Syrian authority. 
In other words, levels of political spending have remained relatively high even as the state budget 
has shrunk. 
The supply of oil and oil derivatives is one example of how the government spending has become 
a source for financing the political budget in regime-controlled areas. The Syrian authority has 
covered its daily needs of oil and fuel from different sources. The first one has been imports from 
international markets, mainly from Iran and Russia (Shaar, 2019). The second source has been 
the oil produced in the north east Syria where the Self-Administration has been trading oil with the 
regime for water and electricity.6  The last source has been crude oil, extracted from areas under 
the control of the regime. For the first two sources, the Syrian authority has depended on influential 
3  Author’s calculations based on the total current spending and the total amount of wages and salaries announced by the 
Syrian government. See Enab Baladi article (in Arabic) “Al-Assad approved the state budget for the year 2021” available: https://
enabbaladi.net/archives/442391 
4  Author’s estimation based on the current spending categories in previous years in addition to the announcements of 
many Syrian government ministers and officials. 
5  The needed amount is expected to be higher, where the minister of oil announced in 2020 that Syria needs around 2.4 
billion US dollars to cover its needs of oil and oil derivatives. See article (in Arabic) “the Minister of Oil: Syria needs to import 122 
thousand barrels of crude oil per day”. Available: https://b2b-sy.com/news/1033348933/ 
6  A report in Al-Sharq Al-awsaat newspaper (2019): “The struggle on the Syrian Oil” (In Arabic). Available at: https://bit.
ly/2WUeQx9
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economic networks to provide the required quantity. They have used their shadow companies 
outside Syria to secure the needed oil for the Syrian government from external markets. Shadow 
companies are not new to the Syrian political economy, but they have proliferated during the 
conflict, primarily to help the regime avoid sanctions post-2011. These economic networks have 
also coordinated and negotiated with businesspeople and key persons in north east Syria to 
transport oil to the regime- controlled areas. 
The Syrian government has signed formal contracts with private companies and businesspeople. 
These contracts often include high profit margins for the elites. For example, in December 2020, 
the Minister of Internal Trade stated that the government is paying an average of 1000 Syrian 
Pounds for each liter of fuel.7 This meant an additional amount of 0.22 US dollar on each litre 
compared to the selling prices of fuel in Lebanon,8 which has been among the main channels 
of transporting fuel to Syria. With fuel consumption of 5.5 million litres per day,9 this additional 
amount has been estimated at around 400 million US dollars per year, which forms about 15 
percent of the 2021 budget and is expected to feed into the political budget. It is worth noting 
that the additional cost could include high commissions for banks and intermediaries to use 
non-US financial channels. Yet, these commissions are paid illegally and in coordination with the 
warlords selected by the regime to conduct such transactions. 
Today, Hussam Katerji is one of the warlords who are benefiting from state budgets through 
legal oil-related contracts with the government. He is a Parliament member in Damascus and he 
owns the  Katerji Group with his brothers that has been involved in transporting oil from north 
east Syria to the oil refineries in regime-controlled areas (Cornish, 2019). His brother Baraa has 
had control over a Lebanese company that imports oil and fuel, mainly from Iran (Ibid). Moreover, 
early this year, President Assad approved the establishment of two private oil refineries that were 
owned by one of the Katerji companies, Arvada Petroleum.10 It is worth noting that in regime-
controlled areas, there are only two public sector oil refineries.
In return, Katerji brothers have been always keen to show loyalty to the Syrian authority. For 
instance, they have established their own militia in the Deir-Ezzour governorate under the claim of 
protecting their investment in the area; yet, this militia has been managed under the supervision 
of the regime security agencies (Winter, 2019). They have also maintained good connections 
and financial relations with tribal leaders to facilitate their oil-related businesses and to keep 
these leaders under the regime’s influence (Ibid). Finally, Katerji brothers have been among the 
main importers of the Iranian oil to Syria (Cornish, 2019). This shows that, in addition to the 
Syrian authority, Iran has been able to exercise a degree of control over Syrian public resources, 
including a part of public spending, and its allocation for political purposes.  
                           
Wheat supply is another example of how the regime has been reallocating public resources for 
the benefit of its cronies and warlords. Syria’s wheat production sharply dropped from more than 
4 million tons in 2010 to less than 2.2 million tons in 2019 (FAO, 2020). The drop in wheat yield 
and the fact that a large share of the wheat production in Syria is located outside the control of 
the regime, have forced the Syrian government to depend on its businesspeople to secure the 
needed quantity of wheat. In 2019, the director of the Syrian Public Establishment for Grain - 
responsible for purchasing, storing and marketing wheat- stated that the government had signed 
three contracts with the private sector to import 600 thousand tons of wheat at an average 
7  Interview of the Minister of Internal Trade, Talal Barazi, with Alwatan newspaper (in Arabic). Available at: https://alwatan.
sy/archives/238939 
8  A report prepared by Kassioun newspaper on “looting subsidies and public support in Syria” (in Arabic). Available at: 
https://kassioun.org/economic/item/66663-50 
9  Interview with the Minister of Oil, Ali Ghanem, with state TV (in Arabic). Available at: https://www.facebook.com/mopmr.
gov.sy/videos/683274285424359 
10  Enab Baladi article (2020): “Al-Assad approves establishment of two oil refineries”. Available at: http://bit.ly/2LdiwpN 
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price of 275 US dollars per ton.11 Thus, the Syrian government has been buying wheat for an 
additional 75 US dollars per ton, compared with the international cost and freight of wheat at 200 
US Dollars per ton.12 This has reaped a huge profit margin of 45 million US dollars diverted from 
public spending to fund business elites. It is likely that some of this spending has been recycled 
back into the regime’s political budget. 
Among these elites was Samer Foz, a tycoon who has made a fortune during the conflict by 
benefitting from the war economy dynamics in Syria. He has had a wide range of businesses 
inside the country including pharmaceutical, cement, tourism, transportation, and media projects 
in addition to wheat trade and distribution to the Syrian government (Rasmussen and Osseiran, 
2018). Part of his business in Syria has been based on formal contracts with the government, paid 
from state budgets to deliver basic goods such as wheat transactions (Ibid). 
In return, Samer Foz has been providing the regime with an access to international market 
through his offshore company branches, headquartered in Moscow.13 This also reflects the deep 
connections with Russia, which is one of the main allies of the Syrian authority. Knowing that 
Foz has been placed under sanctions by the US14 and the EU countries15, one could envisage 
the illegal transnational networks through which he has maintained his businesses outside Syria. 
Furthermore, Samer Foz has funded the military security shield forces militia under the supervision 
of Air Force Intelligence Directorate - one of the Syrian authorities’ core security institutions.16 
The above two examples show how the regime has been financing a part of its political budget 
by using government spending. This has resulted in a reallocation of the already decreasing 
public resources from the majority of Syrians and into the pockets of the few business loyalists. 
The amount of political budget distributed by the Syrian authority towards these loyalists has 
depended on the services they have provided and their relations to external powers. However, 
the recent seizing of the businesses and properties of Rami Makhlouf,17 who used to be the most 
important crony capitalist in Syria, indicates that the regime still has the capability to scale down 
or replace anyone among its elites. Although there is little evidence, it is likely that a combination 
of factors was responsible for Makhlouf’s loss of influence. These include the regime’s desire 
to have direct access to his financial networks, its unwillingness to tolerate Makhlouf’s growing 
power and influence in coastal regions, and finally, the desire to signal to both internal players and 
external patrons that the regime remained dominant in the Syrian political arena. It is therefore 
worth underlining the fact that the Syrian authority is able to change, replace, or attack individuals 
within business elites, but at the same time it is in dire need of the business elites as whole. In 
other words, even as the regime remains reliant on business elites, it remains the pre-eminent 
player in the Syrian political market.       
11  Interview of, Youssef Al-Kassem, the acting director of the Grain Establishment with Alwatan newspaper (in Arabic). 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3n527B0  
12  A report prepared by Kassioun newspaper on “Unexplained 20 billion Syrian Pounds for wheat imports” (in Arabic). 
Available at: https://kassioun.org/economic/item/61978-20-2019 
13  Pro-justice project, Samer Fawz profile. Available at: https://businessmen.pro-justice.org/en/samer-fawz/ 
14  ALJAZEERA (2019): “US imposes sanctions on Syrian mogul for supporting Assad”. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2019/6/11/us-imposes-sanctions-on-syrian-mogul-for-supporting-assad  
15  European Council Implementing Decision 2019/87; Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0087&from=EN 
16  Pro-justice project, Samer Fawz profile. Available at: https://businessmen.pro-justice.org/en/samer-fawz/




In the 2000s, the Syrian regime began to shift public resources’ away from government spending 
on basic goods and services towards the political budget. During the conflict, the Syrian authority 
accelerated this shift. The business elites have had increasing and legal access to state budgets 
through government procurement and contracts. This has further depleted already shrinking 
public resources and has amplified the influence of cronies and warlords. In return, the regime has 
expected these elites to play a vital role in sustaining its authority by supporting military activities 
and opening new financial channels with external markets. The constantly escalating cost of 
maintaining support from the elites has decreased the regime’s bargaining power with its external 
patrons Iran and Russia, though internally it continues to control the means of coercion and state 
institutions. The primary outcome of this arrangement, however, has therefore been a move towards 
greater use of coercion by the regime. The more the Syrian authority reallocates resources for the 
benefit of the political budget, the less capable it is of establishing a social contract with its citizens. 
Consequently, the Syrian regime, and in dealing with the majority of Syrian people, has moved from 
‘the carrot and stick’ ruling system to an approach reliant almost entirely on ‘sticks’. This has left 
Syrians with neither political rights nor economic benefits.     
References 
CHRISTOU, W. & SHAAR, K. 2020. 2021 budget reveals the depth of Syria’s economic woes. Atlantic 
Council.
CORNISH, C. 2019. The men making a fortune from Syria’s war. Financial Times.
DAHER, J. 2020. The Political Economy of Syria: Deepening Pre-War Orientations. Bawader - Arab 
Reform Initiative.
DALILAH, A. 1999. Public Budget Deficit and Ways for its Treatment (in Arabic). Policy memo 
presented at the Syrian Economic Society.
DE WAAL, A. 2016. Introduction to the Political Marketplace for Policymakers. The Justice and 
Security Research Programme, Policy Brief 1.
DESAI, R. M., OLOFSGA, A. & YOUSEF, T. M. 2009. The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains. Economics 
& Politics, 21.
FAO 2020. GIEWS COuntry Brief: The Syrian Arab Republic. Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations.
HABER, S. 2002. The Political Economy of Crony Capitalism. Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth 
in Latin America: Theory and Evidence. Stanford - Hoover Institution Press.
HADDAD, B. 2012. Business networks in Syria : the political economy of authoritarian resilience, 
Stanford, Calif., Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press.
HATAHET, S. 2019. Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria. Chatham House.
ICG 2004. Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges. International Crisis Group, Middle 
East Report N.24.
KHASHAM, H. 2016. An Uprising Waiting to Happen. World Affairs: The Journal of International 
Issues, 20, 108-123.
MEHCHY, Z., HAID, H. & KHATIB, L. 2020. Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria. Research 
Paper - Chatham House.
RASMUSSEN, S. E. & OSSEIRAN, N. 2018. Out of Syria’s Chaos, a Tycoon Builds a Fortune. The Wall 
Street Journal.
SCPR 2013. Socioeconomic Roots and Impacts of the Syrian Crisis. Syrian Center for Policy Research.
SHAAR, K. 2019. The Syrian Oil Crisis. Middle East Institute, Policy paper 2019-17.
TURKMANI, R., ALI, A., KALDOR, M. & BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, V. 2015. Countering the logic of war 
economy in Syria: evidence from three local areas. London School of Economics and Political 
Science.
WINTER, L. 2019. The Katerji Group: A New Key Player in the Syrian Loyalist Universe. OE Watch - 
Foreign Military Studies Office, September.
Find out more about the Conflict Research Programme
Connaught House





Amy Crinnion, Programme Manager
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631
Email: Intdev.Crp@lse.ac.uk
lse.ac.uk/conflict
This information can be made available in alternative formats, on request.
Please contact: Intdev.Crp@lse.ac.uk
The London School of Economics and Political Science is a School of the University of 
London. It is a charity and is incorporated in England as a company limited by guarantee 
under the Companies Acts (Reg no 70527).
The School seeks to ensure that people are treated equitably, regardless of age, 
disability, race, nationality, ethnic or national origin, gender, religion, sexual 
orientation or personal circumstances.
Disclaimer: This material has been funded by UK aid from the UK government; however the views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
Please note that the information provided is accurate at the time of writing but is subject to change.
